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JOHN T. LOUGHRAN
1889-1953
While this issue of the FORDHAm LAW REVIEW was on the press,
the Editors learned of the sad and sudden death of the Honorable
John T. Loughran, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of New
York. His address, delivered as the Charles Evans Hughes Memorial
Lecture before the New York County Lawyers Association in Decem-
ber 1952, appears as a leading article in this number.
Judge Loughran was born in Kingston, New York, in February
1889, and was educated at the Kingston Academy. He matriculated
in the Fordham University School of Law in September 1908 where
he continued for three scholastic years. In June 1911, he received
his degree of LL.B. from the School summa cum laude. Subsequent
to his admission to the Bar he practiced law in his native city until
September 1912, when he was appointed to the faculty of the Law
School. Promoted first to Associate Professor and then to Professor
of Law, he taught successive generations of law students for eighteen
years. He also engaged in the practice of law during most of this
period in this city. In the Fall of 1930, he was elected a Justice
of the Supreme Court of New York for the Third Judicial District.
He assumed office in January 1931, and served for over three years,
impressing all of the members of the Bar who came in contact with
him by his judicial temperament, his unfailing courtesy, his remark-
able memory and his learning in law.
In the Spring of 1934, he was appointed by the Governor of the
State a Judge of the Court of Appeals to fill a vacancy on the Court.
Nominated for a full term by all parties, he was elected an Associate
Judge in the following fall and continued to serve in that capacity
until 1945. In that year Governor Dewey appointed him Chief
Judge of the Court upon the death of Chief Judge Irving Lehman.
Again nominated by all parties, he was elected for a full term in that
office in which he was serving when God called him home on March
31, 1953. In April 1952, he received the Gold Medal awarded by
the Law Alumni for the first time in that year and to be awarded
annually to a distinguished graduate of the School.
His death constitutes a great loss to the State and to his Court
as well as to the School of Law.
The Editors extend their deep sympathy to his son and family
and pray God to grant eternal repose to his soul.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXII MARCH, 1953 NUMBER 1
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT
JOHN T. LOUGHRANt
I. THE AUTHORITATIVE FORCE OF PRECEDENTSR ECENT years have produced a great number of learned disquisi-
tions by jurists and legal scholars in respect of the nature, the
function and the scope of the age-old legal doctrine of stare decisis.
There are those who have urged the complete abolition of the doctrine.
They would leave the courts free to approach each case on its indi-
vidual merits and to decide it on fresh considerations of equity and fair-
ness, without being shackled by what they call the "dead hand" of
the past. But the doctrine of stare decisis has not lacked ardent and
capable proponents, who have defended it as a source of stability and
as an invaluable technique of judicial decision. With that defense,
however, there has come a reappraisal and reevaluation of the basic
function and limitations of the doctrine.
I cannot agree with those who would cast the courts completely
adrift from the moorings provided by the wisdom and experience of
those who preceded us. On the other hand, I cannot go along with
those who insist upon a rigid and mechanical adherence to the decisions
of the past, without regard to the impact of later day social, economical
and political changes that have been wrought in the world about us.
Indeed if we were to be limited to slavish adherence to precedents and
were not free to apply the decisions and their underlying principles to
changing conditions and situations which did not exist and were not
contemplated when the decisions were made, our decisional law would
in great measure be no more advanced today than it was many genera-
tions ago. The common law has been able to maintain its preeminent
place over the centuries because of its stability and its inherent capacity
for keeping pace with the demands of an ever-changing and ever-grow-
ing civilization.
The interests of stability obviously demand a large measure of con-
tinuity with the past; and the learning and experience of our judicial
t Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
Charles Evans Hughes Memorial Lecture, delivered December 18, 1952.
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forebears supply invaluable tools for coping with present-day prob-
lems. Even so, the danger is ever present that deference to the teach-
ings of the past may lead us to approach current issues with minds
attuned only to the spirit and attitudes of a by-gone day and may de-
prive us of the quality of being responsive to the needs and interests of
the here and now. Our basic approach to the role of precedent in the
judicial process is the key which will determine whether we shall have
a dynamic or a static body of common law.
Although there are instances of deference to custom and precedent
to be found even in primitive societies, the doctrine of stare decisis as
we know it in the common law began to take root with the publication
of the year books in the Fifteenth Century and by the end of the
Eighteenth Century it had become firmly established. In Great Britain
there is still a pretty rigid adherence to precedent, and the House of
Lords considers itself absolutely bound by its prior decisions. Even
in Great Britain, however, there is a tendency to ameliorate the harsh-
ness of prior decisions through t1e process of distinguishing them on the
facts. And even Blackstone, who staunchly espoused the supremacy
of precedents as the exclusive source of the law, declared in his com-
mentaries that a court could refuse to follow a precedent which was,
to use his phrase, "flatly absurd or unjust."
In our country, on the other hand, the doctrine is a more flexible
one, and appellate courts, both federal and state, have declared it to
be their duty, as well as their right, to re-examine and correct their own
prior decisions which later experience has shown to be clearly erroneous
or to have been based on conditions which have materially altered or
have acquired a new significance.
The United States Supreme Court has squarely announced that "when
convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to
follow precedent."' Indeed, the Supreme Court has on numerous occa-
sions, particularly in the field of constitutional law, overruled or de-
parted from prior decisions, to the consternation of some conservative
minded lawyers and litigants as well as of some dissenting members
of that tribunal itself.
In our own Court of Appeals we have similarly, from the earliest
times, affirmed our right and duty to re-examine a question previously
decided by our Court when it appeared that the prior decision was plainly
erroneous or was the product of institutions or doctrines which had
changed. In an opinion rendered as early as 1850, Judge Harris said:
"This court [. .. ] may, and undoubtedly ought, when satisfied that either itself,
or its predecessor, has fallen into a mistake, to overrule its own error. I . . . hold
1. Smith v. Allwright et al., 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). See also Helvering v. Hallock
et al., 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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it to be the duty of every judge and every court to examine its own decisions,
and the decisions of other courts without fear, and to revise them without reluctance.
But when a question has been well considered and deliberately determined, what-
ever might have been the views of the court before which the question is again
brought, had it been res nova, it is not at liberty to disturb or unsettle such decision,
unless impelled by 'the most cogent reasons.'12
Expressions similar to the words I have quoted from Judge Harris,
are to be found in many other opinions rendered by the Court of Ap-
peals. Thus, the older Judge O'Brien in an early case said:
".. . the doctrine of stare decisis, like almost every other legal rule, is not with-
out its exceptions. It does not apply to a case where it can be shown that the
law has been misunderstood or misapplied, or where the former determination is
evidently contrary to reason. The authorities are abundant to show that in such
cases it is the duty of courts to re-exanline the question. '3
Judge O'Brien further cited a comment by Chancellor Kent in his
Commentaries4 that more than a thousand cases could then be pointed
out in the English and American reports, which had been overruled,
doubted or limited in their application.
There is no question, then, of the power and duty, at least of the
courts in this country, to overrule their own prior decisions in proper
cases. Problems, however, still remain as to when that power will
be exercised, and in respect of the extent to which a prior decision must
ordinarily be accorded authoritative force as a precedent.
Nor is there any doubt that the basic tradition of the common law
and sound considerations of policy demand that adherence to precedent
shall be the rule and not the exception, and that departure from that
rule shall be sanctioned only where the justification and need are clear
and cogent. The rule of stare decisis embodies a wise and important
social policy. It at once provides the stability and fair measure of
certainty which are prime requisites in any body of law. It enables
lawyers to advise their clients and permits clients to regulate their
affairs, with reference to the authoritative rules of conduct that the
courts may be expected to apply. In other words, stare decisis assures
the supremacy of the law as well as uniformity and equality in the
application of its principles and precepts. If judges were to be free,
or indeed under the necessity, to decide cases without reference to
principles and doctrines tested by experience and declared in prior
decisions, there would be danger that each judge might become a law
unto himself, with resultant chaos and utter uncertainty. Without the
element of continuity, the law could not fulfill its true function of
2. Baker et at. v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261 (1850).
3. Rumsey et al. v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 133 N.Y. 79, 85, 30 N.E. 6S4, 655
(1892).
4. Vol. 1, p. 477 (13 ed. 1844).
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regulating and protecting the interests of the various groups that make
up society. Hence it is important to bear in mind that the overruling
of a precedent may often cause more harm than good by the unsettling
effect that it may have upon transactions concluded in reliance on the
previously declared rules. Stare decisis also serves the further func-
tion of enabling judges to dispose of their work more readily, without
facing the arduous task of re-examining the basis and soundness of
every rule of law in cases that come before them.
In our own Court of Appeals we do not lightly overrule prior de-
cisions of the Court in which the point at issue has been deliberately
considered and passed upon. The Court has said:
"We should not undermine the law by reversing a decision of this court unless
it has been demonstrated to be erroneous through the failure by us to consider a
statute, prior decision, material fact or other substantial feature, or unless through
changed conditions it has become obviously harmful or detrimental to society. .... 
There are indeed certain fields of the law in which our Court has
found adherence to settled rules to be especially desirable. Preservation
of the stability of property interests or of the security of contracts,
wills, trusts or of commercial transactions generally, may thus often
demand retention even of antiquated rules. A case we had in 1929 is
illustrative of this point: Madjes v. Beverly Development Corp. et al.0
The problem there presented was whether gas ranges supplied by a
landlord for the use of tenants in an apartment house were to be consid-
ered as part of the realty within the meaning of the conditional sales law.1
The issue was squarely presented whether the Court should follow a
decision rendered by it in 19138 that such gas ranges remained personal
property even after their attachment to the real estate. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Crane observed that apartment houses had become mas-
sive things and that gas ranges were standard equipment therein, and
he urged that it would be pressing the facts "into an old-fashioned mold"
to hold that such ranges, after attachment to the real estate, did not
become a part thereof. A majority of the Court, however, rejected
that contention and pointed out that the conditions mentioned by Judge
Crane were in existence at the time the earlier case was decided, and
that the Court had nevertheless there laid down a rule of property which
had doubtless governed the conduct of buyer and seller in innumerable
sales which had since been made. Hence we refused to alter a rule
of property so well established, stating that the legislature could pro-
vide any necessary relief.
5. Matter of Grifenhagen v. Ordway et al., 218 N.Y. 451, 458, 113 N.E. 516, 518
(1916).
6. 251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929).
7. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERT'Y LAW § 67.
8. Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N.Y. 10, 103 N.E. 822 (1913).
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Similarly, in 1925 in Crowley v. Lewis et al.,O the Court felt itself
bound to follow the early rule of Briggs et al. v. Partridge et al."' that
a contract under seal could not be enforced against an undisclosed prin-
cipal. The Court said: "We do not feel at liberty to change a rule so
well understood and so often enforced. If such a change is to be made,
it must be by legislative fiat." In support of that decision, the Court
declared: "Thousands of sealed instruments must have been executed
in reliance upon the authority of Briggs et al. v. Partridge et al. Many
times the seal must have been used for the express purpose of relieving
the undisclosed principal from personal liability. It may not be un-
wise to preserve the distinction for this especial purpose. But whether
wise or unwise the distinction now exists."
In another decision in 1925, Cammack v. J. B. Slattery & Bro.,
Inc.,1" the Court, dividing four to two, declined to overrule the ancient
doctrine that a parol executory contract was ineffective to modify a
contract under seal, notwithstanding that in prior cases the Court had
questioned the soundness of the doctrine and had refused to apply it
where the later contract was partly executed. The Court acknowledged
that the ancient rules relating to seals were technical and incongruous.
None the less for that, however, a majority of the Court felt that radical
modification of those rules was best left to the legislature, since that
body could avoid any injustice as regards contracts previously executed
by giving the legislation only a prospective application. Judges Cardozo
and Lehman dissented without opinion. Judge Cardozo indicated the
basis of his dissent in one of his classic essays'12 in which he observed that
the Cammack case afforded a fitting opportunity to uproot an ancient evil
and keep the decisional law in pace with the movement of events, without
injury to any interest worthy of protection. He added that no party
dealing fairly could then honestly claim that when he entered into
the parol contract modifying the prior contract under seal, he relied
on the ancient doctrine which denied effect to the modifying contract.
The remedy was provided some years later in the form of legisla-
tion limiting the legal effect of seals upon written instruments 3
In the field of criminal law, the strong public policy which scrupu-
lously protects the rights of an individual accused of crime, has insisted
that the courts shall not overrule the settled interpretation of a criminal
statute so as to make criminal, conduct previously held not to be vio-
9. 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925).
10. 64 N.Y. 357 (1876).
11. 241 N.Y. 39, 148 N.E. 784 (1925).
12. PARADOXES OF LEGAL S=cE 71, 72 (1928).
13. N.Y. CiV. PAC. ACT § 342.
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lative of statute. The Court of Appeals has regarded the settled inter-
pretation of the criminal statute in such a case as establishing "a rule
of personal liberty quite as firmly established in this state" as is a rule
of real property, which the court could not change "without enacting
in effect an ex post facto law."'1 4 Such considerations would not, how-
ever, preclude the courts from altering an antiquated judicially declared
rule or doctrine even in the field of criminal law, where the change
would be beneficial rather than harmful to a defendant.
Reference to situations in which stare decisis serves the function of
preserving the stability of property interests or the security of contracts,
wills, trusts and commercial transactions generally, presents but a frag-
mentary phase of the doctrine. In fact, there are numerous other situa-
tions in which the Court of Appeals, and other courts as well, have re-
garded themselves bound by stare decisis to follow an earlier doctrine or
rule which they themselves might not apply in a case of first impression,
even where there has been no question of the security of property inter-
ests or any elements of reliance upon previous decisions. As Judge
Cardozo has observed, "Sometimes the commitment to an outworn
policy is too firm to be broken by the tools of the judicial process.Mr)
Many such examples can be cited in which the court has been in-
fluenced by the settled nature of the challenged rule. Thus, in the
leading case of Cudlings v. Goetz et al.,'0 the Court of Appeals rejected
assaults made upon the general rule that an owner of real property,
who has turned over control of the premises to a lessee, is not liable
in tort to a third person injured as the result of the owner's failure
to fulfill his contract with the lessee to keep the premises in repair.
Though the Restatement of Torts had adopted the contrary view, and
though there was countervailing authority in other jurisdictions, the
Court declared:
"The doctrine, wise or unwise in its origin, has worked itself by common acquies-
cence into the tissues of our law. It is too deeply imbedded to be superseded or
ignored. Hardly a day goes by in our great centers of population but it is applied
by judges and juries in cases great and small."l17
Perhaps the contention could have been made in Cullings v. Goetz et al.
that owners of real property had relied on the previously declared law in
entering into contracts with their lessees to make repairs, but no such
consideration was stressed in the opinion.
Long continued acquiescence was also assigned in another case as
14. People v. Tompkins, 186 N.Y. 413, 416, 79 N.E. 326, 327 (1906).
15. See Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 12, at 63.
16. 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931).
17. Id. at 291, 292, 176 N.E. at 398.
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the reason for not interfering with prior decisions which sustained the
right of testamentary trustees to commissions computed on the basis
of gross, rather than net, rentals of real property owned by the estate;
though a minority of the Court in this instance disputed the claim that
the proposition in question was so well established as to be beyond
attack.'8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals did not hesitate in one
case to reject a long continued practice in mortgage foreclosure pro-
ceedings founded upon decisions of the Appellate Division, where the
question had not previously been presented to the Court of Appeals.1"
But that was not an instance of disregard of the principle of stare decisis,
since there was no decision on the question in the Court of Appeals.
In 193220 the Court declined to depart from the long established
rule that a conviction in a criminal action is not conclusive proof in
a civil action of the facts on which the judgment of conviction rests,
notwithstanding that the Court recognized that the rule itself might
well be subject to criticism and that the reasons which earlier cases had
assigned for the rule had become "weak and outdated." Declaring
that the situation could be corrected by the legislature, the Court never-
theless acknowledged that it might take it on itself to provide a remedy
"were the occasion imperative and the necessity clear," but held that
in this instance "established precedents are not to be lightly set aside
even though they seem archaic.'
A large number of the cases in which the doctrine of stare decisis
has been held to immunize challenged rules or doctrines against judicial
alteration have involved the construction of statutes-2 2  In that situa-
tion, where the legislature has acted in the field, there is of course
strong warrant for the view that an allegedly erroneous construction of
the legislature's intention should be left for correction by the legislature
itself, at least where the interpretation is of long standing and'the
claim of error is not indisputable. Even here, however, no inflexible
proposition can be laid down that the court will under no circumstances
itself step in and correct its own error of interpretation.
In the application of stare decisis generally, the question whether
an issue once determined shall be re-examined in a later case, is neces-
18. Matter of Schinasi, 277 N.Y. 252, 14 N.E. 2d 58 (1938).
19. Prudence Co. v. 160 W. 73rd St. Corp. et al., 260 N.Y. 205, 183 N.E. 36S (1932).
20. Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
21. Id. at 314, 179 NX.. at 712.
22. E.g., Matter of Hodges, 294 N.Y. 58, 60 N.E. 2d 540 (194S); Sweet & Co. v
Provident Loan Sodety, 279 N.Y. 540, 18 N.E. 2d 847 (1938); Maher et al. v. Ran-
dolph, 275 N.Y. 80, 9 NX.. 2d 786 (1937); Meyers v. Credit Lyonnais, 259 N.Y. 399,
182 N. . 61 (1932).
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sarily one of degree, to be determined by reference to a variety of con-
siderations. The courts are particularly loath to indulge in the abrupt
abandonment of settled principles and distinctions that have been care-
fully developed over the years. It is not essential, however, to pre-
serve a particular rule against overturning, that there be a long line
of cases in which it has been applied, though that circumstance, would
weigh heavily in its favor. Even a single, carefully considered decision
is thus endowed with authoritative force as a precedent, and this not-
withstanding that it has been rendered by a divided court.2 4 Nor does
the weight of a precedent necessarily deteriorate with age. It is like-
wise ordinarily not alone sufficient to warrant reconsideration that the
court, or a majority thereof, would be inclined to render a contrary deci-
sion were the matter res nova.
Whether the occasion will be deemed sufficiently impelling to call
for a change of decision by the courts, will often turn on a combination
of the aforementioned factors, and especially pertinent considerations
in this regard will be the basic soundness of the challenged doctrine
and the continued existence and validity of the conditions and circum-
stances under which it arose. Thus, "precedents drawn from the days
of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel today." Al-
though basic principles may not change from one generation to another,
"the things subject to the principle do change," as "the needs of life
in a developing civilization require. '25
Cogent considerations for denying continued authoritative force to
a decision as a precedent are to be found where the decision is the
product of conditions which have since radically altered, or the decision
is grounded on distinctions which have been eliminated by subsequent
judicial action or by statute. Even then, however, the life of the prece-
dent may not be at an end. Though the reasons which originally
impblled the decision may no longer exist, the underlying principle
may still be a valid one; or it may still have some legitimate function
with appropriate modifications. The courts may then reaffirm or adapt
the old rule or doctrine on the basis of some new rationale, in which event
it will embark on a new career. If, on the other hand, the old rule is
at variance with modern-day needs and conceptions of justice and fair
dealing, it may well be scrapped or refused extension beyond the pre-
cise facts on which it was predicated.
Other factors, too, may sometimes serve to tip the scales in favor of
23. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche et al., 255 N.Y. 170, 187, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (1931).
24. Semanchuck v. Fifth Ave. & 37th St. Corp., 290 N.Y. 412, 420 49 N.E. 2d
507, 509 (1943).
25. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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change. There may thus have been a significant trend of authority in other
jurisdictions contrary to the challenged decision in the period follow-
ing its rendition. Or a competing body of doctrine may have developed
within the same jurisdiction which is in principle or spirit, if not in letter,
inconsistent with the decision in question. Gradual erosion of the
authoritative force of a questionable precedent is thus often accom-
plished by the courts' refusal to extend the precedent by analogy to
situations not within its exact letter. As the rule applied in such situa-
tions gains adoption in an increasing number of cases, the demise of
the older precedent becomes but a matter of time.
Sometimes, in the development of a line of cases stemming from an
initial decisional rule newly applied in a novel situation, or involving
the interpretation of a novel statute, the courts may find it necessary
to reject some prior decision or the language used in some prior opinion
in rounding out the underlying principles on the basis of experience.20
Often, indeed, departure from a particular precedent may be de-
manded in the interest of reaffirming a principle of broader scope and
greater soundness, from which such precedent was itself an aberration.'
The refusal in such circumstances to follow the errant decision, not-
withstanding that it be the latest in line, is not a denial, but rather
effectuation, of the doctrine of stare decisis.
There is, in short, no simple formula for determining when the courts
will themselves undertake the role of revisers and when they will defer
in that respect to the legislature. The answer will generally turn on
the compelling force of the considerations favoring change as compared
with the factors of stability and certainty. In some instances, how-
ever, judicial intervention may be inappropriate because the proposed
change is one which "could not safely be made without the kind of
factual investigation" for which the legislature, rather than the courts,
is equipped."
We were recently squarely confronted in our Court with the prob-
lem whether a precedent of an earlier day barred us from applying
a rule of liability in tort which a majority of us deemed to be clearly
more consonant with policy and with the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions. The issue specifically was whether an action for negli-
gence lay to recover for prenatal injuries sustained by an infant plain-
tiff in the ninth month of the mother's pregnancy. Our Court had in
26. See Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 (1926); Matter of Masse v. James
H. Robinson Co. et al., 30"1 N.Y. 34, 37, 92 N.E. 2d 56, 57 (1950); Matter of Cameron
v. Ellis Construction Co. et al., 252 N.Y. 394, 399, 169 N.E. 622, 624 (1930).
27. Cf. Helvering v. Halock et al., 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
28. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E. 2d 691, 694 (1951).
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the earlier case of Drobner v. Peters"' in 1921 held, with one dissent,
that no such action could be brought. In reaching that conclusion, a
majority of the Court, though sympathetic to the plaintiff's claim,
emphasized that the weight of authority at that time denied any right
of action for the benefit of the unborn child, and reference was also
made to the difficulty of proving causal connection in such a case and
to the theoretical lack of separate existence of the unborn infant. Judge
Pound, writing for the majority, reasoned in this way: "The conditions
of negligence law at the present time do not suggest that the reasons
in favor of recovery so far outweigh those which may be advanced
against it as to call for judicial legislation on the question."3 °
When the issue came before us again in the later case of Woods v.
Lancet 81 in 1951, we found that there had been a pronounced trend
of authority in other jurisdictions since the date of our earlier decision,
as well as commentary by legal writers, supporting a right of action.
A majority of our Court, in an opinion by Judge Desmond, felt that
the rationale of the earlier decision was no longer supportable, and
that it was our duty, as well as our right, "to adapt and alter (the]
decisional law to produce common-sense justice." Concluding that the
principal reason assigned by the Court for its holding in the earlier
case-lack of precedent-no longer existed, and that there was no
other sound basis for such a holding, we declined to follow Drobner v.
Peters and sustained the infant's right to maintain the action.
Two members of our Court dissented on the ground that while a
change in the law was desirable, it should be accomplished by legis-
lative rather than judicial action. They felt that if a right of action
were to be granted, it should be done, not "by a judicial decision on
the facts in a single case," but by carefully considered legislation which
could provide a solution for various problems presented by the sub-
ject. The majority of our Court, however, considered that we would be
abdicating "our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory," were
we to "refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule."
We deemed the courts fully qualified to deal with the situation in the
traditional common law manner, meeting the problems as they arose
in specific cases.
Sometimes indeed legislative action may serve as the impetus for a
change in the decisional law. An example is to be found in a recent
condemnation case 2 which called into question the continued validity
29. 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
30. Id. at 224, 133 N.E. at 568.
31. See note 28 supra.
32. Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood et al, 300 N.Y. 231, 90 N.E. 2d 53 (1949).
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of a rule announced in some early decisions that an expert witness
called for the purpose of proving value could not testify on direct ex-
amination as to the sales prices of other comparable property in the
neighborhood. In a unanimous decision we declined to follow that
rule as unsound and antiquated. We noted that there was a definite
countervailing trend of authority in this State, manifested both in
legislation and judicial decision toward permitting proof of value by
direct evidence of sales of comparable property in the neighborhood.
We further noted that the reason assigned for the early rule was not
the irrelevancy of such testimony, but rather that collateral issues would
thereby be presented. Our conclusion, however, was that while the
rule may originally have had pragmatic value in the early days when
the court calendars were cluttered with a great number of elevated
railroad cases, we knew of no trial conditions of the present day which
would "warrant the exclusion of relevant testimony in favor of trial
expediency."
In another significant case, Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co. et al.,"
the problem presented was whether the obligation and effect of a check
drawn in Illinois and payable in New York were to be determined for the
purpose of ascertaining its validity with reference to the law of Illinois
or that of New York. The Court of Appeals had, in an early case," held
that the rights and obligations of the holder and the drawer of a dis-
honored check were to be determined by the law of the place where
the check was by its terms payable. In a later case involving a bill of
exchange, however, the Court has held that the contract of the drawer
of the bill was to be determined with regard to its form, nature, obliga-
tion and effect by the law of the place where the bill was drawn (i.e.,
where the contract was made). 36 The Court there distinguished its earlier
decision on the basis that it involved a check, and that a check differed
from a bill of exchange in that the drawer of a check contracted to pay
at the place where the check was payable whereas the drawer of a
bill of exchange contracted to pay at the place where the instrument
was drawn.
Confronted by these two decisions, the Court in an opinion by Judge
Lehman, chose "upon authority and upon principle" to "readopt the
rule as formulated" in the bill of exchange case and to extend it to
checks. The Court pointed out that the foundation of the distinction
33. Sec Robinson et al. v. New York Elevated R.R. Co., 175 N.Y. 219, 67 N.E.
431 (1903) and cases there cited.
34. 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E. 2d 992 (1939).
35. Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe et al., 84 N.Y. 367 (18S1).
36. Amnsiack et al. v. Rogers et al., 189 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. 134 (1907).
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drawn in the earlier case between checks and bills of exchange, founded
upon mercantile custom, had been destroyed by the negotiable instru-
ments law, which in general applies the same rules to both types of in-
struments, and that it was incumbent upon the Court to select a uni-
form rule applicable to both. In selecting the rule previously applied
to bills of exchange, which made the law of the place of contracting the
controlling law for determining the validity of the instrument, the Court
noted that that rule had been adopted by the Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws.
The influence of statutory revision upon the course of decisional law,
is further illustrated by a line of cases relating to the immunity of
governmental instrumentalities from liability in tort. The immunity
from suit that is conceded to sovereignty, originally led the courts in this
State to exempt from liability for the torts of its agents and employees,
not only the State and every one of its municipal divisions, but even
a private charitable institution to which the State had delegated one
of the functions of government, such as the care of wayward or delin-
quent children." The private institution was held to enjoy the State's
immunity in so far as it performed a function of the State as its agent.
In 1929, however, the State, by action of the legislature, waived its
sovereign immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and em-
ployees, and consented to the presentation of claims therefor in the
Court of Claims." Problems then arose as to the effect of such
waiver in respect of the tortious acts of agents or employees of munici-
pal divisions of the State or of private institutions exercising State
functions.
The issue was first presented in the case of Paige v. State of New
York,3 9 whether the State had, by its waiver, assumed liability for in-
juries suffered by a person confined in a privately operated quasi-penal
institution for wayward children as the result of the negligence of an
employee of such institution, and the Court of Appeals, by a divided
vote, resolved the issue in the affirmative. The statute was thus con-
strued in the view that it constituted "a recognition and acknowledgment
of a moral duty demanded by the principles of equity and justice."4
It was then a short step to the proposition, soon thereafter declared,
41
that the derivative immunity of the private institution as an agent of
37. See, e.g., Corbett v. St. Vincent's Industrial School, 177 N.Y. 16, 68 N.E. 997 (1903).
38. N.Y. Laws of 1929, c. 467, adding § 12-a of COURT OF CLmis AcT; now § 8.
39. 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936).
40. Id. at 356, 199 N.E. at 618, quoting from Jackson v. State of New York, 261 N.Y.
134, 138, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933).
41. Bloom et at. v. Jewish Board of Guardians, 286 N.Y. 349, 36 N.E. 2d 617 (1941).
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the State fell with the State's waiver of its own immunity. "The same
principles of justice and equity which constrained the State to reject
the immunity conceded to it as sovereign," we there held, "dictates
the conclusion that the derivative immunity of the agent does not sur-
vive when the immunity of the principal is destroyed."4 2
Equally compelling was the conclusion reached in two subsequent
decisions, that the previous immunity of the civil divisions of the State-
its counties, cities, towns and villages-for the torts of their officers
and employees, was also at an end. Since such divisions do not have
any independent sovereignty, and since their exemption from liability
was rested on the State's immunity, we held that such exemption was
terminated by the State's waiver, "even if no separate statute sanctions
that enlarged Iability in a given instance. 43
Just as there are fields in which adherence to precedent is especially
desirable, so there are other zones in which a larger measure of flexi-
bility is committed to the courts. The United States Supreme Court
has thus pointed out that "in constitutional questions, where correction
depends upon" the difficult process of constitutional "amendment and
not upon legislative action," that "Court throughout its history has
freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional
decisions."11 The Supreme Court has indeed on many occasions over-
ruled prior decisions on constitutional questions where that course has
been deemed demanded by "the lessons of experience and the force of
better reasoning."'4  Since this is a Charles Evans Hughes Memorial
Lecture, I note that Chief Justice Hughes himself did not hesitate
squarely to overrule, as a departure from principle, the earlier decision
of his Court in Adkins et al. v. Children's Hospital"0 on the issue of the
validity of minimum wage legislation, when that issue came before the
Court again years later in a changed atmosphere of opinion.
7
In this State it is not as difficult to obtain a constitutional amend-
ment as it is in the federal area, and the reasoning of the federal deci-
sions may therefore not be fully applicable. We have ourselves, how-
ever, on occasions overruled prior decisions involving the construction
or application of the State Constitution."8 I wrote the opinion in one
42. Id. at 352, 36 N.E. 2d at 618.
43. Bernardine v. City of New York et al., 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 2d 604 (1945);
Holmes v. County of Erie, 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E. 2d 369 (1944).
44. Smith v. Allwright et al., 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
45. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 4 BAR Ass!,i RacoRD 152 (1949).
46.. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
47. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish et a., 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
48. See, e.g., Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916).
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such case4 9 where the question was the constitutionality of a New York
statute of 1933 which imposed a stamp tax on transfers of shares of
par value corporate stock, measured solely by the number of shares
transferred and without regard to the actual or face value of the shares.
The Court of Appeals had in a decision rendered in 1907 declared invalid
a similar tax statute. Since the date of the earlier decision, however,
the legislature had authorized the issuance of shares of no par value,
thereby adopting the view that face value as a symbol of the real worth
of shares in a corporation was a conception that had been rebutted by
experience. That change in policy and the consequent alteration of
the corporate structure brought in its train problems of taxation which
spread beyond the field of the newly authorized shares. It appeared
that, to avoid taxation, many corporations thereafter reduced the face
value of their par value shares, creating a serious problem for the State
taxing authorities. Against the background of these intervening changes
in corporate organization and in the State's policy, we re-examined the
basis of the 1907 decision in the light of certain expressions of the
United States Supreme Court on a related question, and we concluded
that the earlier decision was unsound and could not stand in the way
of the new legislation.
Other subjects in which greater flexibility is desirable have been said
to be those of evidence and of procedure generally5 ° Indeed, there have
been many proposals to commit the entire field of procedure to rules of
court.which could be readily modified as occasion demanded.
There are a number of instances in which the courts have exercised
the power to revise their own decisional law governing procedure with-
out waiting for action by the legislature. One line of such cases con-
cerns the interpretation of what is now Section 1296, subdivision 7, of
the Civil. Practice Act. That subdivision provides that upon judicial
review of a quasi-judicial determination made by an administrative
agency, the court shall determine, among other matters, "whether, up-
on all the evidence, there was such a preponderance of proof against
the existence of any of ... [the] facts [essential to the determination]
that the verdict of a jury, affirming the existence thereof, rendered in
an action in the supreme court triable by a jury, would be set aside by
the court as against the weight of the evidence."
As suggested by a literal reading of its broad language, the statute
was interpreted in several early decisions as expanding the scope of
review that would otherwise prevail and as authorizing the courts to
review the administrative agency's determination on the question of
* 49. Vaughan et at. v. State, 272 N.Y. 102, 5 N.E. 2d 53 (1936).
50. See CARDozo, THE NATuRE OF T= JUDICIAL PROC ESS 156 (1928).
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the weight of the evidence.Y1 Such an interpretation was, however,
inconsistent with the general current of decisions in the federal sphere
and in other state jurisdictions, and with the policy of subsequently
enacted statutes in this State governing particular agencies, which
narrowly limited the scope of review open to the courts. In that view
the courts are powerless to review the administrative agency's determina-
tion on the weight of evidence, their function being limited to ascer-
taining whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence-
i.e., such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Under the impetus of this decisional and legis-
lative trend in favor of narrowing the zone of judicial interference with
administrative determinations, the Court of Appeals gradually altered
the earlier interpretation of the language of Section 1296, subdivision
7, of the Civil Practice Act so as to read into it the limitations of the
substantial evidence rule. 2 And the latter-day interpretation is indeed
now firmly entrenched.
Another example of a procedural change by court decision is to be
found in the case of People v. Nixon et al. 3 where the Court rejected
and declined to follow, as artificial and unjust, earlier decisions which
required the defendant in a criminal case tried without a jury in an
inferior court to make a formal motion to dismiss in order to preserve
for appeal the point that the evidence was legally insufficient to warrant
conviction. The Court there stated:
"It is right that this court should hesitate to overrule a previous decision, but
when convinced that an artificial rule of practice, created by it, is erroneous and
hampers the administration of justice, it is its duty to refuse to perpetuate previous
error."
54
II. APPLICATION OF PRECEDENTS
Lest my discussion concerning the overruling of precedents may
serve to give an erroneous impression, I must emphasize that in the
majority of cases that come before our Court, no question arises as to
the authoritative force of applicable precedents. Where problem does
arise as to the application of precedent, it is generally that of deter-
minin.g whether the facts in the particular case are such as to fall within
the ambit of one or another of the established precedents.
51. People ex rel. Gilson v. Gibbons, 231 N.Y. 171, 177, 131 N.E. 879, 8S0, 881 (1921);
People ex rel. McAleer v. French, 119 N.Y. 502; 503l 23 N.E. 1061, 1063 (1890).
52. Matter of Miller v. Kling, 291 N.Y. 65, 50 N.E. 2d 546 (1943); Matter of Webber
v. Town of Cheektowaga et at., 284 N.Y. 377, 31 N.E. 2d 495 (1940). Cf. Matter of
Roge v. Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E. 2d 751 (1939); People ex rel. Guiney v.
Valentine, 274 N.Y. 331, 8 N.E. 2d 880 (1937).
53. 248 N.Y. 182, 161 N.E. 463 (1928).
54. Id. at 192, 161 N.E. at 467.
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There are, however, occasions where one aspect of the facts will call into
play one principle or precedent, and another phase will suggest a counter-
vailing principle or precedent. The problem then is to determine which of
the competing principles or doctrines is entitled to prevail in the case.
The answer to that question may in some instances turn on an analysis
of the factual situation. In other cases, the answer may depend on
which is the more dominant of the contending interests represented by
the respective precedents. That will require an appraisal of the under-
lying considerations of policy, of equity and justice, as well as those of
history and of logic. As has often been observed, law represents a
quest for probabilities rather than absolute certainties and the various
principles and rules that are to be extracted from decided cases can-
not in all circumstances be mechanically and inflexibly applied by logical
methods alone, without consideration of the consequences. The rules
laid down in prior cases must be subjected to scrutiny as the occasion
demands, with an eye to whether the law is serving its true function-
the achievement of justice according to law. A rule followed in one
case may thus have untoward consequences if extended by a process
of logical deduction to a different set of facts. The propriety of such
an extension must be judged, not alone by reference to principles of
logic but by evaluation of considerations of fairness and of the public
welfare.
The danger of pursuing general maxims to their logical conclusions,
without regard to the practical consequences, finds illustration in the
case of Hynes v. New York Central R. R. Co." In that case the plain-
tiff's intestate, a lad of 16, had been swimming with two companions
on the Bronx side of the Harlem River, a navigable stream. Along that
side of the river was the right of way of the defendant, the New York
Central Railroad, which operated its trains there by high tension wires
strung on poles and crossarms. Projecting from the defendant's bulk-
head above the waters of the river, was a plank or springboard from
which boys of the neighborhood used to dive. This springboard pro-
jected beyond the line of the defendant's property, and out over the
water, for a distance of some seven feet. Plaintiff's intestate climbed
on the springboard, intending to leap into the water. As he stood
there, poised for his dive, a crossarm with electric wires fell from the
defendant's pole, and the wires struck the boy and flung him from the
shattered board to his death.
The courts below held that the springboard, though projecting be-
yond the line of the defendant's property, was nevertheless to be re-
55. 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921).
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garded as a fixture annexed to, and therefore part of, the defendant's
property, and that the boy was consequently a trespasser on the de-
fendant's land. In that light their conclusion was that the defendant
owed no duty to the boy except to refrain from causing him wilful or
wanton injury.
The Court of Appeals divided, four to three, on the propriety of
the application and extension of the concept of trespass to the facts of
this case.
The majority of the Court, in an opinion by Judge Cardozo, empha-
sized that the dominant consideration was that as a bather lawfully
engaged in the use of a public waterway, the boy was entitled to rea-
sonable protection against destruction by the defendant's wires, and that
though in a technical sense he was an intruder on the defendant's land,
realists would more readily say that he was "still on public waters in
the exercise of public rights." 0  Analyzing the factual situation, the
Court observed that the lad's "every act ... from his first plunge into
the river until the moment of his death, was in the enjoyment of the
public waters, and under cover of the protection which his presence in
those waters gave him," and that "the use of the springboard was not
an abandonment of his rights as bather" but "was a mere by-play, an
incident, subordinate and ancillary to the execution of his primary
purpose, the enjoyment of the highways."5 7 The Court further ob-
served that the use of the springboard was not the cause of the disaster,
and that the boy would have met his death even if he had been below
the springboard or beside it. In short, as Judge Cardozo analyzed the
case, there was no moment when the lad was beyond the pale of the
duty owed by the defendant to persons lawfully using the public water
way.
In determining that the concept of trespass had to yield in that case
to the competing principle governing the public's rights in the use of
the public waterways, the Court frankly acknowledged that it was
giving effect to considerations of policy and justice, as well as to those of
analogy.
Growth of the law is indeed made possible only by viewing decisional
rules laid down in the past, not as hard and fast formulas but as flexible
standards, which the courts must evaluate in terms of underlying prin-
ciples and consequences, and this may require modification or adjust-
ment as it is sought to apply them to different shadings of fact that
may arise from time to time.
Our Court was thus confronted some years ago with the problem
56. Id. at 236, 131 N.E. at 900.
57. Id. at 234, 131 N.. at 899.
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of applying the ancient rules and precedents governing the essential ele-
ments of a covenant running with the land, to a present-day situation. 8
Specifically, the issue was whether a covenant by a grantee of a lot in
a new residential development to contribute a fixed sum each year to
the maintenance of roads, parks, beaches and sewers in the development,
was a covenant that ran with the land so as to be enforceable against a
subsequent purchaser. One of the essentials of such a covenant, as
declared by precedent, was that it be one "touching" or "concerning"
the land, and there were some decisions that, as a general rule, a covenant
to pay a sum of money was a personal affirmative covenant which did
not "touch" or "concern" the land. Some exceptions had, however, been
recognized to that general rule, and our analysis of the decisions yielded
the principle that the covenant must be one which in purpose and effect
substantially affects the legal rights flowing from the ownership of the
land and connected with the land. The question, in short, was one of
substance rather than form, and we concluded that, though there was
no precedent squarely in point, the covenant in that case was one that
touched or concerned the land, since in substance it directly affected the
easement or right of common enjoyment that the property owner would
have with others in the roads, parks, beaches and sewers of the develop-
ment, to the maintenance of which he had convenanted to contribute.
A further problem in the same case was whether the covenant was en-
forceable upon the suit of a corporate association of the various property
owners, which was the assignee of the benefit of the covenant but did
not have title to any property in the development and had no interest
of its own in the enforcement of the covenant. It was urged that the
requisite privity of estate was lacking as between the parties, and as
a matter of precedent no right to enforce even a restrictive covenant
had been previously sustained in this State where the plaintiff did not
own property which would benefit by such enforcement. Here again,
however, looking to substance rather than form, we sustained the
plaintiff's right of action on the theory that it was merely the instru-
mentality through which the property owners, who did have a sufficient
interest to enforce the covenant, were acting for the advancement of
their common interests. We observed that "only blind adherence to
an ancient formula devised to meet entirely different conditions" could
constrain us to the contrary conclusion.
In the application of precedent, it is of primary importance to de-
termine what it is that is vested with authoritative force. It has been
aptly observed that "A judicial opinion, like evidence, is only binding
58. Neponsit Property Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 15 N.E. 2d 793 (1938).
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so far as it is relevant, and when it wanders from the point at issue it
no longer has force as an official utterance."50  Our Court has accord-
ingly declared that "in applying cases which have been decided, what
may have been said in an opinion should be confined to and limited by
the facts of the case" in which "the expressions relied upon were made,
and should not be extended to cases where the facts are essentially
different.""0
It is indeed vital for the courts to guard against "the notion that
because 6, principle has been formulated as the ratio decidendi of a
given problem, it is therefore to be applied as a solvent of other prob-
lems, regardless of consequences, regardless of deflecting factors, in-
flexibly and automatically, in all its pristine generality."'' °
The doctrine of adherence to precedent, in short, does not demand
merely mechanical application of principles, rules or attitudes enunciated
in the past. It has not prevented the New York courts from approach-
ing present-day problems in a spirit of fairness and responsiveness to
current needs.62  It has not prevented them from breathing new con-
tent into common law theories of liability as experience has broadened
their outlook and given them deeper insight into the underlying prob-
lems. It has, in general, not prevented them from striving to give full
effect to the true function of the common law as a stable regulatory
force, but at the same time, as "a living organism which grows and moves
in response to the larger and fuller development of the nation."C4
59. See Colonial City Traction Co. v. Kingston City P. Co., 154 N.Y. 493, 495s, 48
N.E. 900, 901 (1897).
60. Crane v. Bennett, 177 N.Y. 106, 112, 69 N.E. 274, 276 (1904).
61. See Cardozo, Jurisprudence, N.Y. ST. BAR Ass 's REP. 263, 291 (1932).
62. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche et al., 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 181, 174 N.. 441,
445 (1931).
63. See Oppenhein v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 164, 140 N.E. 227, 230 (1923).
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